Fragility of Iraq’s Political System: Where is the exit?

The Fragility of Iraq’s Political System: Structure, Stalemate, progress, and Prospects for Reform

Yousif Goran, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Faris Al-Faris, Al-Sadara Faction
Fudhil Farajallah, Dawa Party
Stam Saeed, Change Movement
Noor Al-Majid, Journalist (Moderator)

In a policy debate that assembled a wide ideological spectrum, including four Iraqi political figures, Yousif Goran (PUK), Faris al-Faris (Alsadara Faction), Stam Kamil (Change Movement), and Fadhel Farajallah (Dawa Party), the foundations and current dysfunctions of Iraq’s political system were debated. Moderated by journalist Nour Almajid, the discussion addressed fundamental issues ranging from federalism and institutional decay to sectarian power-sharing, legislative paralysis, and regional entanglements.

With the start of the panel, the moderator posed a provocative question: can Iraq still be described as undergoing a political experiment, or has it transitioned into a fully-fledged political system? For Yousif Goran, a senior figure in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and former Minister of Higher Education, the answer is multifaceted. He contended that while Iraq technically possesses a political system, the system is deficient as it “does not reflect the vision laid out in the Iraqi constitution.” He pointed to the absence of critical federal components, most notably the Federal Council, as evidence that the Iraqi state falls short of the constitutional model to which it ostensibly adheres.

Goran underscored the anomaly of Iraq’s federalism, which remains confined to a single recognized region, the Kurdistan Region, without the broader inter-regional framework that characterizes functioning federal states. “No federation in the world operates with only one region,” he observed. Furthermore, he lamented the failure to establish a second parliamentary chamber, mandated by the constitution to represent the interests of regions and governorates, arguing that the lack of bicameralism distorts national representation and policy deliberation. In his words, “this deficiency creates an imbalance in legislative decision-making, allowing a single chamber to dominate a country that was meant to be federal.”

Turning to legislative efficacy, Faris al-Faris, a senior figure in the Al-Sadara bloc and former member of parliament, cast a critical light on the performance of Iraq’s legislature. He acknowledged the theoretical centrality of parliament in Iraq’s political architecture, “the parliament is the engine room of the state,” he remarked, but maintained that it has repeatedly failed to fulfill its constitutional and national mandate. Al-Fares cited deep internal fractures, political rivalries, and persistent absenteeism as symptoms of a broader malaise, noting that “if the parliament were successful, this session would not be titled ‘the fragility of the political system’.”

Al-Faris offered a sobering account of how the Sunni bloc, in particular, has been unable to consolidate leadership or assert political independence, especially regarding the long-vacant position of parliamentary speaker, a post allocated to the Sunni community. He accused the Shia Coordination Framework of overreach, claiming that “they selected our candidates for us, without consultation,” referring specifically to the nomination of Mahmoud al-Mashhadani. His remarks revealed the extent to which mistrust and sectarian maneuvering have permeated the highest echelons of Iraq’s legislative process.

The issue of sectarian and ethnic power-sharing, muhasasa, was addressed in greater depth by Stam Kamil, an academic and senior member of the Gorran (Change) Movement. He framed muhasasa as a paradox: initially envisioned as a mechanism to ensure inclusive governance and prevent domination by any single group, it has since become a vehicle for systemic corruption and causing political inertia. “It [consociationalism] was meant to respect Iraq’s diversity and ensure balance, but it has become a tool to divide the state’s resources among political elites,” he argued. Kamil called for a national shift from a “state” defined by bureaucracy to a “homeland” that inspires belonging among citizens of all backgrounds. Without this transformation, he warned, Iraq would remain a fragmented polity vulnerable to perpetual conflict.

In addressing the failure to forge a shared national identity, both Kamil and Goran found common ground. Goran highlighted the absence of what he described as “an inclusive Iraqi identity that transcends sect and ethnicity,” emphasizing that most political actors continue to operate within narrow communal frameworks. This reality, he warned, reinforces the logic of muhasasa, not out of preference, but necessity. Without a unifying civic identity, quota-based power-sharing remains the only mechanism to ensure representation and prevent marginalization. Yet even this model, he argued, has reached its limits, having failed to evolve into a meritocratic or law-based governance system.

Kamil expanded the discussion by framing nation-building as a dual challenge, domestic and regional. Domestically, he argued, Iraq must undertake meaningful and far-reaching reforms to its governance structures, anchored in the rule of law. Regionally, Iraq must navigate a delicate geopolitical balancing act among an increasingly competitive and polarized array of actors, including Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and the Western bloc.

Fadhel Farajallah, a senior figure in the Da’wa Party and former head of the Iraqi Media Network, offered a more tempered perspective. He objected to the term “fragile” to describe the system, preferring instead to see Iraq as a young democracy in the early stages of evolution. “Twenty years is not a long time in the life of nations,” he said, emphasizing the need for historical patience. He acknowledged institutional shortcomings but also highlighted areas of progress, such as improved personal freedoms and the expansion of political pluralism. However, even he conceded that the political process has been marred by party fragmentation and recurring breakdowns in coordination among political elites.

When the discussion turned to regional dynamics, Stam Kamil broadened the lens to include Iraq’s geopolitical positioning. He likened the Middle East’s current crises to Europe’s Thirty Years’ War, suggesting that the region remains trapped in a protracted sectarian and ideological struggle. He called for a modern-day “Treaty of Westphalia”, a foundational pact among states to respect sovereignty and pursue stability. Iraq, he argued, must play a balancing role in this environment, and he praised the current government’s efforts to maintain neutrality amid escalating regional tensions. “Iraq cannot afford to be partisan in a region this unstable,” he said, underscoring the strategic necessity of equilibrium.

The panel’s closing remarks centered on the prospects for reform and the responsibility of Iraq’s political class to enact meaningful change. Fares al-Fares stressed the need to clarify the electoral law, particularly the mechanisms for forming parliamentary majorities. He criticized the post-2018 interpretation of the “largest bloc” rule, arguing that it incentivizes post-election deal-making at the expense of voter intent and good governance. “We are trapped in a vicious cycle of political bargaining, where power is bought, not earned,” he warned.

In contrast, Farajallah defended the current administration under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, asserting that the government was formed with broad participation and deserves sustained support. He rejected claims that the Coordination Framework is obstructing Sunni leadership choices, stating instead that the problem lies in the lack of internal consensus within the Sunni camp. “The framework never imposed a candidate; it simply waited for the Sunnis to agree among themselves,” he clarified.

Throughout the discussion, despite diverging opinions and varying degrees of optimism, the panelists shared a common diagnosis: Iraq’s political system remains in flux, caught between aspiration and inertia. Whether framed as fragile, immature, or merely incomplete, it is clear that structural reforms, genuine political will, and a unifying civic identity will be critical to transforming Iraq’s governance from a quota-based competition into a stable and inclusive democracy.