Iraq: State-Building Amidst the Evolving Political Dynamics (A)
- Ammar Al-Hakim, Leader, Al-Hikma Movement
- Tariq Jawhar Sarmami, Academic (Moderator)
Introduction and Context
The Middle East Research Institute (MERI) Forum hosted a significant panel discussion featuring Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Al-Hikma Movement and an influential figure within Iraq’s Coordination Framework and the State Administration Coalition. Moderated by academic and commentator Tariq Jawhar Sarmami, the dialogue provided a broad platform to examine the trajectory of Iraq’s state-building process, the evolution of federal governance, intergovernmental relations, and the future of political cohesion across Iraq’s diverse communities. The discussion took place against the backdrop of Iraq’s persistent structural and constitutional challenges, lingering post-2003 political transformations, and a shifting landscape in Baghdad-Erbil relations.
This appearance marked al-Hakim’s third participation at MERI, underscoring his consistent engagement with Kurdistan Region stakeholders and his attempt to position himself as a bridge figure between national and regional actors. His intervention framed the current moment in Iraqi politics as one of cautious optimism—an inflection point in which political maturity and policy continuity are beginning to emerge after decades of volatility and fragmentation.
State-Building, Stability, and Institutional Challenges
Al-Hakim began by acknowledging the fundamental preconditions for state-building, asserting that the development of institutions and democratic governance in Iraq requires a stable political, security, social, and economic environment. He painted a sober picture of the country’s past, emphasizing that for decades, Iraq has experienced cycles of conflict, instability, and authoritarianism, followed by the difficult transition into a post-Saddam democratic order. According to al-Hakim, “We were constantly emerging from one crisis only to enter another, from one dilemma into the next.” He likened Iraq to a patient recovering from major surgery—alive, conscious, and hopeful, but still bedridden and in need of care.
He noted that in the years following 2003, Iraq grappled with the multifaceted threats of terrorism, sectarian violence, and societal disintegration, yet recent developments—particularly over the last two years—have indicated a transition toward greater coherence. He cited improvements in security operations, where Iraqi forces are now taking preemptive actions against terrorist networks rather than reacting after the fact. “We are dismantling networks before they act,” he remarked, “and every week, major operations are carried out against cells planning attacks.” This enhanced security posture, combined with a broader regional and international acceptance of Iraq’s new political role, provides, in his view, the necessary momentum for accelerating state-building efforts.
Despite this progress, Iraq is still up against unresolve challenges. The moderator pointed to overlapping authorities among the three branches of the government—executive, legislative, and judicial—causing friction constitutional gaps and delayed implementation of key articles which act as barriers to institutional consolidation. He specifically noted that while the 2003 constitution laid a foundation for federalism and civil governance, many of its clauses, including Articles 112 and 140, have yet to be translated into actionable laws. The moderator also lamented the delays in forming essential federal institutions, such as the Federation Council, and emphasized that more than 30 articles of the constitution still require implementation through modern, civilian legislative frameworks.
Starting with the legislative branch, al-Hakim discussed the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Speaker of Parliament—a situation he attributed to intra-Sunni competition, which, in turn, triggered divisions within both Shia and Kurdish blocs. Each Sunni faction, he explained, insisted on its own candidate and lobbied the Coordination Framework and Kurdish parties for support, ultimately prolonging the crisis. “This internal competition among Sunni forces created parallel splits within the Shia and Kurdish spheres,” he observed. Nonetheless, he expressed hope that an upcoming session of parliament would result in the election of a speaker, thereby resolving an impasse that has persisted for over a year.
Al-Hakim connected this legislative stalemate to a broader point: that sustainable political and economic development cannot occur in the absence of political stability. He laid out a cascading model—political stability enables security; stability and security lead to economic growth; growth fosters social cohesion; and these dynamics together create the conditions for national integration and international engagement. “People do not necessarily feel the value of political stability,” he said, offering the metaphor of a smooth airline journey: the comfort of the seat, the quality of service, and the food all contribute to the experience, but the pilot—the political system—often goes unnoticed until something goes wrong.
Regarding the often-cited Oil and Gas Law, al-Hakim contended that the primary barrier is not parliamentary procedure but conflicting philosophies. The challenge lies in agreeing on the underlying logic for managing and distributing national wealth, not simply passing a law. “How do we ensure a fair distribution of wealth on which the country is reliant to a great extent? What are the rights of the regions, governorates, and the like? What are the rights of the federal government?”, he questioned. Similarly, the debate over the structure of the Federation Council—whether it should represent provinces or function like a senate of elites and former leaders—is still unresolved. “The moment we settle on a philosophy,” he asserted, “the law will be passed.”
Federalism, Baghdad-Erbil Relations, and the Deep State Debate
On the issue of federalism, al-Hakim acknowledged that while the Iraqi constitution mandates decentralized governance, Iraq’s historical legacy of centralization continues to shape institutional behavior. Many within the state apparatus, and even among political elites, remain attached to a centralized model—sometimes out of habit, sometimes out of a well-intentioned but misguided belief in national unity. He admitted that the transition toward functional decentralization has been slow and encumbered by both legal ambiguities and outdated institutional cultures. For example, when provincial councils were dissolved, federal ministries gradually reclaimed authorities that should legally belong to local governments. The restoration of these councils in the most recent elections, he noted, has reignited a contest over governance boundaries.
In terms of the Kurdistan Region, al-Hakim spoke with nuance. While he acknowledged the complexity and sensitivity of issues such as revenue sharing, the status of the Peshmerga, disputed territories, and the federal court’s rulings, he emphasized the spirit of mutual compromise that has emerged in recent years. He credited Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and Prime Minister Sudani for fostering an environment of flexibility and trust. “In two years,” he noted, “we have achieved what we couldn’t in twenty.” Still, he cautioned that genuine reconciliation requires ongoing communication, transparency, and a willingness to disarm long-held suspicions.
On the controversial concept of a “deep state,” al-Hakim downplayed its applicability in Iraq’s current political context. If the term refers to the ruling coalition, he argued, then it is merely the result of a parliamentary system in which governments emerge from political alliances. If it refers to bureaucratic actors resisting reform, he believes that such individuals ultimately serve the institutional structure, not private interests. “When political leaders leave office,” he observed, “they often find that the people they thought loyal to them were actually loyal to the state.”
Evaluation of the Sudani Government and Political Perceptions
Al-Hakim praised the performance of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government, attributing its relative success to both the Prime Minister’s managerial skills and the supportive political environment created by years of groundwork. While acknowledging that no administration is without shortcomings, he highlighted the unprecedented levels of public approval—up to 70%, according to some polls—and the commitment to delivering services and infrastructure.
Importantly, he noted that this is the first administration to regularly report on the implementation of its government program. Monthly or bi-monthly meetings of the State Administration Coalition include updates from al-Sudani himself, supported by a committee of seven ministers from various blocs. According to the latest figures, 72% of the program has already been fulfilled. “If someone doubts these numbers,” al-Hakim stated, “they should ask their own party’s ministers why they signed off on them.”
He also addressed the recurring gap between public approval of prime ministers and the relatively lower confidence in political parties. While this may suggest a personalization of governance, he interpreted it more optimistically: as parties become associated with effective governance, public trust in them could be rehabilitated.
Political Alliances, Elections, and Shifting Dynamics
Looking ahead to the 2025 national elections, al-Hakim discussed the evolving nature of political coalitions. He reiterated that the Coordination Framework is not a single electoral bloc but rather a platform for coordination among like-minded parties. As such, its members may compete separately in elections and realign post-election to form governing coalitions. This approach, he argued, encourages political pluralism without undermining unity.
He also addressed a structural shift in Iraqi politics: the transition from inter-sectarian conflict to intra-sectarian and intra-ethnic political competition. Al-Hakim considers this shift a positive development, arguing that internal debates within the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities are no longer defined by identity but by divergent policy views. “Today,” he said, “a Kurdish or Shia party may feel closer to a partner from another component than to rivals within their own group. This is political maturity.”
Final Reflections and Messages to Kurdistan and Beyond
In his concluding remarks, al-Hakim offered a message of encouragement to both the people and leadership of the Kurdistan Region, congratulating them on the successful conduct of regional elections. He emphasized the importance of maintaining the positive momentum achieved in Baghdad-Erbil relations and called for continued dialogue grounded in trust and shared interests.
He also addressed broader regional concerns, reiterating Iraq’s firm political, humanitarian, and moral support for the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples in the face of Israeli aggression. Calling for the establishment of a dedicated reconstruction fund for post-conflict recovery in Palestine and Lebanon, al-Hakim positioned Iraq as a country morally committed to regional solidarity and resistance against injustice.
MERI Forum 2024
Iraq: State-Building Amidst the Evolving Political Dynamics (A)