This report focuses on the Eyzidi community, one of the largest minority groups in Iraq, and their perceptions on conflicts and future reconciliation following the Islamic States (IS) invasion in 2014. The violence inflicted on this community by IS, combined with long-standing historical grievances, make their views on and attitudes toward the concept of reconciliation particularly relevant for the future stability of Iraq. By focusing on the question of what reconciliation means to the Eyzidi community in Iraq, this study aims to map historic and more recent grievances, intra- and inter-community conflicts and tensions, and uncover community-held perspectives on conflict and reconciliation.
This report starts by placing emphasis on the need of avoiding imposing presumed definitions of reconciliation on the Eyzidis context. Although the term itself has not yet been conclusively defined, peacebuilders and those engaged in reconciliation efforts after IS should be cautious about its usage and be clear as to what they mean by ‘reconciliation’ in their programmes. Failing to do this, significant efforts and financial resources may be wasted or yield little return. In addition to mentioning Eyzidism, this report also examines pre-IS dynamics in order to understand the attitudes well. To this end, the researchers have highlighted two factors that have largely shaped the socio-economic status of Eyzidis: (1) Their identity as an ethno-religious minority in Iraq’s system of governance, and (2) The ongoing land disputes and competition over resources between Baghdad and Erbil.
The findings of this study reveal that the Eyzidis suffer from internal and external conflicts. Externally, IS’s violent attack and sexual enslavement of Eyzidis have greatly damaged the Eyizid-Sunni Arab relations. Further, the KRG and the Iraqi government do not seem to enjoy a favourable stance among the Eyzidiz; the KRG is seen to be largely focused on its own agendas while the Iraqi government is deemed to be neglectful of the Eyzidis. Internally, a minority of Eyzidis are beginning to consider themselves as a separate ethnic group rather than Kurds. This sentiment has grown among the people in Shingal since the KRG has not pursued a healthy policy in this area. There is also a gap between the community and political representatives. Many Eyzidis do not feel represented as a result of the political affiliations of their leaders. In addition, the presence of a considerable number of armed groups in the Nineveh Plain that enjoy the support of the Eyzidis may lead to worrying friction between part of the Eyzidi community and the KRG.
The interviews for this report have been conducted in the summer of 2016 as part of a study funded by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). The findings of this study have been reported to USIP at the time and now made accessible for a larger audience as a service to those seeking to assess the extent to which Eyzidi grievances have been or are being addressed in the aftermath of IS’ defeat in Nineveh. Although some views and opinions expressed by participants in this study may have been taken over by events, the findings of this study nevertheless constitute a form of documentation of the plight of the Eyzidi community in Iraq.