Iraq: State-Building Amidst the Evolving Political Dynamics
In a wide-ranging and candid discussion at the MERI Forum, Muthanna Al-Samarrai, head of the Iraqi Al-Azim Alliance, shed light on the evolving dynamics of Sunni political representation in Iraq, the paralysis of parliamentary leadership, the challenges of IDP return, and the prospects of federalism. The session, moderated by Abdulaziz Aljarba, tackled both present governance dilemmas and long-standing post-conflict concerns, particularly in Iraq’s liberated provinces.
Aljarba opened the discussion by noting the importance of revisiting the political trajectory of Iraq’s Sunni-majority provinces since their liberation from ISIS in 2017. He emphasized that the formation of the Al-Azim Alliance—a coalition of newly formed, local political entities—was a direct response to the power vacuum that followed. Despite earning significant parliamentary representation (around 30 MPs), the Sunni bloc has faced serious internal and external challenges, not least of which is the unprecedented year-long vacancy in the position of Speaker of Parliament, traditionally allocated to the Sunni component under Iraq’s post-2003 power-sharing norm.
Al-Samarrai explained that the absence of a parliamentary speaker was not, contrary to popular narrative, solely due to intra-Sunni disagreements. Rather, he argued, all components—Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis—face internal fragmentation, and the delays were a product of broader political complexities and inter-bloc rivalries. “This is not just a Sunni-Sunni issue,” he said. “We’ve seen Kurdish-Kurdish and Shia-Shia disagreements stall appointments in the past.” He also hinted that certain political actors benefit from the delay in electing a Sunni speaker, using it as leverage in broader negotiations, especially in relation to electoral laws and the Independent High Electoral Commission.
In addition to the importance of ending the wrangling over the parliament speakership, Al-Samarrai acknowledged the deeper strategic questions at stake—namely, the future of Iraq’s electoral framework and the role of the parliament in addressing politically sensitive legislation. “We must clarify to the Iraqi public that these delays are not technical but rooted in political maneuvering,” he stated.
The conversation then shifted toward the humanitarian legacy of ISIS, particularly the situation of over 800,000 estimated internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have yet to return to their areas of origin. Aljarba raised serious concerns about demographic engineering, with some IDPs reportedly blocked from return by militias and political factions in Baghdad’s belt, Nineveh, Diyala, and Babylon. Al-Samarrai acknowledged these challenges and described how displacement had long been exacerbated by the marginalization of Sunnis after 2003, the rise of Al-Qaeda, and ultimately ISIS. However, he noted that recent security reforms had started to produce results, citing Samarra as an example where security responsibilities were transferred from the army to the Ministry of Interior and the federal police. He pointed to improved infrastructure, reconstruction funding, and reduced checkpoints as signs of progress, while emphasizing the need for continued government and community engagement—particularly from religious endowments such as the Sunni Waqf—to rebuild state-society trust and facilitate return.
On the issue of Sinjar, a city that remains one of the least reconstructed and most administratively neglected in post-ISIS Iraq, Al-Samarrai expressed solidarity with its diverse population, especially the Yazidis. He noted that parliament and the federal government had allocated funds specifically for Sinjar. Prime Minister Sudani, he added, had initiated recruitment of local residents into the security forces. While, these efforts are noteworthy, implementation on the ground remain very much limited. Numerous reasons have caused this failure, but Al-Samarrai pointed to the lingering disputes among Nineveh’s political factions as an obstruction to meaningful progress. “We are working with the governor and central government to restore governance and facilitate the return of the displaced,” he affirmed.
The discussion also addressed recent tensions in Diyala and Kirkuk, where local councils were experiencing serious dysfunctions, including rivalries, removals, and contested appointments. Al-Samarrai criticized the electoral threshold (1.7) that produced fragmented councils, arguing that a higher threshold (1.9) would have incentivized broader coalitions and eased post-election negotiations. He underscored that the Al-Azim Alliance had advocated for inclusive governance in Kirkuk by ensuring representation for all components in the local administration. Nonetheless, he lamented that certain Arab factions acted unilaterally, creating divisions within their own ranks and alienating segments of their constituency. Diyala, he added, had experienced even deeper paralysis, with the local government taking over eight months to form, culminating in the dismissal of the provincial council speaker. “These internal struggles,” he cautioned, “are setting negative precedents for other provinces.”
Finally, the issue of federalism in Sunni-majority regions—particularly Anbar—was raised. Calls for federal status have emerged as a response to perceived marginalization of the Sunnis, yet political reactions remain muted. Al-Samarrai clarified his stance: while federalism is a constitutional right, he personally disfavors this option. He argued that equitable governance and justice would eliminate the root causes behind such demands, that can harm national unity. “Citizens will not demand federalism if they feel equally treated—whether they’re from Anbar, Basra, Erbil, or Nasiriyah,” he said. He urged Iraq’s political elite to prioritize inclusive governance and genuine shared responsibility over territorial fragmentation.
MERI Forum 2024
Iraq: State-Building Amidst the Evolving Political Dynamics (B)